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“Brazil competes with other opportunities, sun is not only in Brazil, it is everywhere. If we do not create 
a more competitive, more favourable environment, the resource finds profitability elsewhere and that’s 
all we do not want at the moment.” 
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As a sun-soaked South American giant with a population of more than 200 million, Brazil is considered 
to have some of the best conditions for solar power worldwide. Despite its tremendous potential, the 
country has so far been rather slow in developing the national solar power market. After a devastating 
energy crisis in its draught afflicted hydroelectric sector, the dawn of solar power seems on the horizon. 
With the goal of diversifying its energy mix, Brazil initiated the large-scale deployment of solar power in 
2014. Three years after its commercial commencement, the solar energy drive is stalled and policy 
efforts seem trivial under deteriorating political and economic conditions. As a comprehensive analysis 
of the industry’s state of affairs is currently insufficiently portrayed, this paper attempts to fill this gap by 
discussing the latest solar market developments and outlining the progress and status of Brazil’s solar 
energy market objectives. While the findings prove a significant discrepancy between the desired and 
achieved progress, this paper also finds that there is reason to be optimistic that the solar market growth 
will be unleashed in the future. As such, the analysis focuses on the critical state of the Brazilian solar 
market in 2017 and showcases the underlying challenges of transforming an energy sector during a 
recession.  
 




































Como um gigante sul-americano encharcado de sol com uma população de mais de 200 milhões, o 
Brasil é considerado como tendo algumas das melhores condições para a energia solar em todo o 
mundo. Apesar do seu enorme potencial, o país tem sido bastante lento no desenvolvimento do 
mercado nacional de energia solar. Após uma devastadora crise de energia em seu projeto de setor 
hidroelétrico, o alvorecer da energia solar aparece no horizonte. Com o objetivo de diversificar seu 
“mix” de energia, o Brasil iniciou a implantação em larga escala da energia solar em 2014. Três anos 
após o início comercial, a energia solar está paralisada e os esforços políticos parecem triviais sob 
deterioração das condições políticas e econômicas. Como uma análise abrangente do estado da 
situação da indústria está atualmente insuficientemente retratada, este trabalho tenta preencher essa 
lacuna discutindo os últimos desenvolvimentos do mercado solar e descrevendo o progresso e status 
dos objetivos do mercado de energia solar no Brasil. Embora os resultados demonstrem uma 
discrepância significativa entre o progresso desejado e o progresso alcançado, este artigo também 
descobre que há motivos para ser otimista de que o crescimento do mercado solar será desencadeado 
no futuro. Como tal, a análise concentra-se no estado crítico do mercado de energia solar brasileiro 
em 2017 e apresenta os desafios subjacentes de transformar um setor de energia durante uma 
recessão. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Concerns over potential changes to the global climate have increased noticeably in recent years as 
advances in scientific understanding have clarified the links between human activities, greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and changes in the Earth’s climate (IPCC, 2007). Urgent actions need to be taken 
among governments, private sector and civil society to tackle the effects of global warming. The Paris 
Climate Agreement, concluded in 2016 under the framework of the United Nations Conference on 
Climate Change (UNCCC), and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), an Agenda 2030 that 
succeeds the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), have set forth promising action oriented 
pathways to a climate resilient development and have shed light on the importance of renewable 
energies in this endeavor (UNFCCC, 2016). 
 
The importance of clean energy stems from the fact that almost two-thirds of global GHG emissions 
come from the energy sector (IEA, 2015). Hence, the deployment of technologies that use less energy 
or that can produce energy with lower CO2 emissions will be inevitable for reducing anthropogenic 
emissions. Today, renewables are described as having finally earned a place in the investment 
landscape as the choice for wind and solar is becoming less an ethical but an economic one (Segers, 
2016). Among the renewable energy sources available, solar is considered to have the greatest 
potential over the next 100 years (Reddy, 2012). Thanks to technological advances, price reductions 
and adequate governmental support policies, the industry has experienced a phenomenal growth in the 
last twenty years.  
 
Figure 1 Global solar PV development - Price vs. Capacities - 1975 – 2016 
 
Source: own illustration with data from ren21 (2017) and Bloomberg (2017) 
As seen in Figure 1, in 1975, the price of solar PV was near US$ 100 per watt and total installations 
came to around 2 megawatts (MW). Nevertheless, over the last 41 years’ things have changed 







































































totaling around 303 Gigawatt (GW). More Photovoltaic (PV) capacities have been installed between 
2010 and 2014 than in the previous forty years and financing for solar has been at a record level of US$ 
161 billion in 2015, accounting for about half of new total global renewable energy investments (EY, 
2016). The beauty of having exponential growth on your side is that very quickly, even the current yellow 
spike (Figure 1 above) will be comparatively small. The International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA, 2016a) puts it in a nutshell: “the age of solar power has arrived”. While most of today´s 
solar power capacities are currently installed in developed countries, emerging economies have made 
significant strides in recent years. China and India are massively scaling up their solar capacities and 
in countries like Chile or the United Arab Emirates solar power is today already more cost efficient than 
coal or gas (Bloomberg, 2017).  
 
With plentiful sunlight and a population of more than 200 million, Brazil is considered to have some of 
the best conditions for solar power worldwide (Brosseau, 2017). Despite its tremendous potential 
including solar radiation that is, on average, twice as strong as in Germany, one of the world leaders in 
solar power generation, Brazil (2016: 84 MW1) is way behind fellow emerging economies such as 
China (112 GW of solar capacity) or India (14,7 GW of solar capacity) in developing the national 
solar power sector (EOLA, 2014; Nuoshu, 2017). Faced by the threat of a potential energy crisis in its 
traditionally strong hydroelectric sector due to drought, Brazil’s government only recently undertook first 
steps towards pushing the solar sector from small pilot projects of kilowatt-scale (solar home systems) 
to commercially operating power plants.  
 
In 2014, Brazil committed to expand its grid connected solar capacities from 0,01 % (~ 21 MW) 
to 3.3 % (7 GW) of the total electricity capacity by 2024 (EPE & MME, 2015). The commitment was 
followed by Brazil’s first national solar capacity auction which resulted in 31 solar parks being awarded 
with a combined capacity of 889 MW and a commercial operating date (COD) anticipated for August 
2017. What no one foresaw at the time was the the unfolding of a drastic economic and political 
crisis in Brazil. The economy contracted by 3.8 % and 3.6 % in 2015 and 2016 respectively and is not 
expected to recover until 2018 (Bloomberg, 2017). The Brazilian Real depreciated more than 40 % 
since 2014 reaching as low as US$/R$ 4.1 in January 2016 (it has since fallen back to R$ 3,26). Power 
consumption fell, creating an oversupplied distribution market and inflation jumped from 6 % in 2014 to 
11% in 2016 (BNEF, 2017). 
 
Ultimately, the economics of many projects deteriorated and were in particularly hurt by the fact that 
solar power delivery contracts were fixed in Brazilian reais as opposed to dollars (BNEF, 2016). Due to 
the resulting high cost and challenging financing conditions, the timely expansion of utility scale 
solar is said to be in jeapardy (Andreão et al, 2017). While the recent economic and political turmoil 
undoubtedly overwhelmed investors, Brazil’s national development bank2 Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), which, as an intermediary of public money, plays a 
key role in incentivizing the uptake of new technologies, has come under criticism by various scholars 
                                                     
1 of which 21 MW are utility scale and 63 MW are off-grid residential solar systems   




for its lackluster funding support and strict lending terms (Transfer LBC, 2015; Ferraz, 2016; BMWi, 
2016; Currie, 2017; Andreão et al, 2017).  
 
Andreão et al (2017), being the only scholar to shed light on the most recent challenges to the expansion 
of solar Photovoltaic in Brazil, sees in particulary the government’s two pronged objective of expanding 
capacity installations while at the same time achieving a progressive nationalization of a Photovoltaic 
industry as key problem for the sector. Due to the relevance of the topic and the fact that ongoing 
struggles in the solar sector are currently insufficiently covered in a comprehensive manner, this 
research was motivated by the attempt to review the latest solar market developments and outline the 
progress and status of Brazil’s solar energy market objectives. The basic hypothesis underlying this 
work is that Brazil’s promotional strategy for solar must come into question as its tremendous 
solar potential is currently being wasted and that benchmarking the results policy mechanisms 
have delivered is cardinal to maintain credibility for the future of the sector.  
 
The idea for this research was developed during a one-year Master programme at the São Paulo 
School of Business Administration FGV-EASP in 2016/2017. The at the time prevailing political and 
economic crisis significantly impacted my study and living experience in Brazil, thereby helping me to 
get acquainted with the ongoing challenges and opportunities faced by companies in Brazil. With a 
personal background in renewable energy engineering and career aspirations in the field of sustainable 
development, Brazil’s desired transition towards a more diversified energy mix ignited my interest to 
bring to light the state of the local solar PV market.  
 
Next to my study, a five-month internship at the Export and Project Finance representative office 
of the German Development Bank (KfW IPEX Bank) in São Paulo, from 23.01.2017 to 30.06.2017, 
gave me the opportunity to confirm the need and relevance for a market study in the solar power sector. 
My participation in client meetings with BNDES, commercial banks, law firms and infrastructure 
development companies helped me to gather useful background knowledge on renewable energy 
financing in South America and allowed me to acquire a good understanding of the challenging 
financing conditions faced by the solar industry in Brazil. Finally, a personal meeting with Ms. Fernanda 
Rocha, an expert from the FGV Center for sustainability study (GVces), led to the specific suggestion 
to review the solar marker development against the background of unstable macroeconomic conditions 
more closely, an area that according to her has been insufficiently researched to date.  
 
1.2 Objective and Scope  
With the above given context, the objective of the thesis is to explore the extent to which solar 
support mechanism have been effective to date and to outline Brazil’s status and progress 
towards delivering on the 2024 target of 7 GW new large scale solar generation capacities.  
The research first employs a descriptive approach to capture the contemporary phenomenon of the 
solar market policy framework in Brazil, following which a brief analysis will review the current state and 
relevant developments from October 2014 to August 2017. Data collection and evaluation was guided 
by a mixed-method approach, using both qualitative and quantitative data to provide a complete picture 
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of both supply and demand activities in the solar sector. Collected data was consolidated, filtered and 





For the first part of the research, a descriptive literature review was undertaken to inform 
the reader about the state of Brazil’s solar market policy landscape. Materials were almost 
entirely drawn from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the Global 
Energy Network Institute (GENI) and Brazilian Renewable Energy Institutions. In addition, 
news articles and existing market studies were reviewed through means of Google 




In the second and more analytical part of the research, data was drawn from inspection 
reports, internal government statistics and periodic publications of the Brazilian Electricity 
Regulatory Agency (ANEEL), the Energy Research Company (EPE), the Ministry of Mines 
and Energy (MME) and the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). Investment data, tools 
and analytics carried out at the Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) terminal at the 
FGV EASP library (Brazil) and the University of Mannheim (Germany) further 
complemented the research.   
 
Although residential (distributed) solar power generation is touched upon, the scope of this thesis 
primarily deals with support policies for utility-scale solar generation (also known as centralized 
generation). The rationale that underpins this decision is the fact that the commercialization of solar 
only recently emerged as opposed to residential solar home systems that have been in the market for 
much longer. On top of that, the exclusion of the residential power sector narrows the research scope 
significantly as the market dynamics for distributed generation are different. The research structure for 
the remaining part of this paper is as follows: 
 
Figure 2 Research Structure 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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1.3 Relevance  
Given the fast-changing policy landscape in Brazil’s energy sector and the lack of a detailed preliminary 
research, the thesis fills a gap in research by responding to the need for discussing the latest solar PV 
market developments and outlining the progress and status of Brazil’s solar energy market objectives. 
As Andreão’s et al (2017) “Financing the Expansion of Photovoltaic Power Generation in Brazil: 
Challenges of using similar mechanisms for different renewable sources” has delivered one of the very 
few contributions in English with respect to the examined topic, the thesis aims to add an additional 
piece of research to the revolving discussion for the international audience. From the point of view of 
professionals, the author provides an up to date market analysis and thus helps in capturing the current 
and futurte investment outlook in Brazils solar generation (deman) and manufacturing (supply) sector. 
Lastly, this work adds to the discussion of Brazil’s underlying economic weaknesses and shows why 
innovation-led growth is such a challenging issue in South Americas largest country. While the focus 
will be on the current state of affairs, the author also tries to shed light on the future challenges and 



























CHAPTER 2 - SOLAR POWER MARKET IN BRAZIL 
2.1 Potential and Expansion plans 
With about 3,000 hours of sunlight a year, Brazil is considered to have some of the best conditions 
for solar power worldwide (GENI, 2010). Estimates for Brazil’s technical solar energy potential 
Brazil vary between 114 GW, by the Global Energy Network Institute, and 193 GW, by the Brazilian 
Solar Photovoltaic Association (2017). Figure 3 (left) illustrates the solar radiation means throughout 
Brazil (kWh/m2). The dark orange colors indicate the region where the radiation is most prominent. Daily 
solar radiation values range from a low of 4.25 kWh/m2 in the State of Santa Catarina – South-East of 
Brazil -  to a high of 6.5 kWh/m2 in the State of Bahia – North-East of Brazil (INPE, 2008). The annual 
solar irradiation mean on the other hand is measured at 1500-2500 kwh/m2, which is much greater than 
the levels for most European countries such as Germany (900-1250 kwh/m2), France (900-1650 
kwh/m2) or even Spain (1200-1850 kwh/m2). In fact, solar radiation in the sunniest region of 
Germany, one of the leaders in the use of Photovoltaic technology, is 40 % lower than in the least 
sunny region of Brazil. Given the abundance of sunlight, experts think that solar power could 
potentially be developed in almost every part of Brazil (Martins et al. 2007). The North-East and the 
Centre region are the best suitable fit. 
 
















Source: adapted from the Brazilian Atlas of Solar Energy (Martins et al. 2007), Solargis and EPIA (2014) 
 
Despite the tremendous potential and near perfect conditions, solar is still a largely unexplored 
source of energy in Brazil. According to the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME, 2016a), the use of 
solar power sources is so far limited to about 10,000 micro and small scale residential systems with a 
cumulative capacity of about 63 MW in 2016. Thus, solar power accounts for less than 10 Watts per 
inhabitant in Brazil (Figure 3, bottom right). In contrast to China’s solar capacities of 112 GW or India’s 
14,7 GW, Brazil’s numbers seem ridiculously small. Even when looking at Bangladesh, a much poorer 
country with less favorable climatic conditions but an impressive number of 1.5 million solar systems, 
Brazil is outclassed (ren21, 2017). One reason for the slow uptake is that the technology and its benefits 
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are not much known to the country as the government has built a traditional culture of dam building, 
favoring hydroelectric generation capacities for its energy expansion (WEF, 2015; Currie, 2017). In fact, 
hydroelectricity composes by far the largest share of Brazil’s total electricity supply of 616 terawatt 
hours (TWh) in 2016 (Figure 4: right site). Unfavorable climate conditions however, lowered its 
contribution over the years from 84,5 % in 2009 to 69,1 % in 2016 and forced Brazil to diversify its 
energy mix (IDB, 2014). Initially, the void was largely filled by coal, natural gas and biomass (Transfer 
LBC, 2015) yet, in the late 2000s, wind power notably gained prominence and is today representing a 
remarkable 6.8 % of Brazil’s electricity supply, up from 0,1 % in 2009 (MME, 2017a, 2017b). The 
contribution of solar energy to the domestic electricity supply is with 0,01 % (~ 21 MW) currently 
unimportant. 3 
 
Figure 4 Electricity Matrix: Share of energy sources in Brazil’s power production, 2009 vs. 2016  
 
 
Source: own elaboration with data from MME 2017a, b and EPE & MME (2017) 
 
With a renewable energy share of 84,6 %, Brazil boasts one of cleanest energy matrices in the world 
(Global Average:  20,3 %). Not surprisingly, Brazil’s emissions of 68 g CO2 per kWh are much lower 
compared to other countries with dirtier electric grids like India (856g CO2/kWh), China (764g 
CO2/kWh), Russia (437g CO2/kWh) or the United States (503g CO2/kWh) (WEF, 2015). With more 
than 200 million consumers and a largely unexplored solar energy market, Brazil is an attractive 
destination for foreign investors (AHK, 2014). As Brazil’s strong dependence on hydropower leaves 
the country vulnerable to extreme weather events which led to severe electricity shortages in 
the past, the simple, clean and rapid deployment of solar Photovoltaic is increasingly perceived 
as an ideal solution to the present challenges (IRENA, 2016b).4 According to Bloomberg new 
Energy Finance (BNEF, 2017), solar power generation can potentially contribute to 20 % of Brazils 
domestic electricity mix by 2040. In contrast to hydro or wind power, one of the main perceived 
advantages of solar power generation is that it can provide electricity to remote areas thereby 
addressing Brazil’s challenge of geographical dispersion5 between electricity generation and 
consumption (Transfer LBC, 2015).  
                                                     
3 Figure 22 in the appendix provides a more detailed overview of the electricity flux from generation to consumption. 
4 Significant capital costs and difficult licensing requirements are other disadvantages with hydro.  
5 Brazil is the 5th largest country in the world by geographic size and thus has the challenge to transmit power across long-distances 
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The rural electrification project Luz Para Todos (“Light for All”) has until recently been the only initiative 
to promote the distribution of solar technology in Brazil (ANEEL, 2017e). With the realization that solar 
is a viable alternative to hydro, the Brazilian government only lately undertook steps to incentivize the 
large-scale uptake of solar. Today, two distinct technical approaches are being supported (Mattar et al, 
2015):  
 
A. Centralized Solar Generation: 
- Grid connected solar power systems of utility scale 
- Installation Capacity: 5 MW - 100 MW 
- Aims to feed energy from large power plants to the electric grid; 
B. Distributed Solar Generation: 
- off-grid solar home systems for self-consumption 
- Installation Capacity: 5 KW - 5 MW 
- Aims to reduce the dependence on the grid through stand-alone residential systems  
 
The medium and long term planning in the Brazilian power sector first revealed in 2004 that there is a 
real possibility for a diversification of the electricity mix with renewables other than hydro (Pepitone, 
2016; Capos Neto, 2016). Despite this early discussion, strategic solar energy targets in terms of 
installed capacities firstly found appropriate recognition in the 2014 published 10-year Energy 
Expansion Plan (PDE 2024), which projected 2,6 GW utility - scale capacities to be installed by 
2018 (1,5 % of energy mix) and foresaw a total of 7 GW by 2024 (3,3% of energy mix). Next to the 7 
GW anticipated grid connected installations, Brazil`s Energy Research Company (EPE) also projected 
1.3 GW from off-grid residential power systems for 2024 (EPE & MME, 2015). Overall, the plan 
estimated the cumulative capacity (centralized + distributed generation) at 25 GW by 2030 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Energy Expansion plan according to the 2004 and 2014 published Targets 
Capacity 
Installed 
2004 2014 2024 2030 
GW % GW % GW % GW % 
Hydro 71 76,5 96 71,8 127 61,1 139 54,2 
Natural Gas 10 10,4 11 8,3 21 10 21 8,2 
Charcoal 1 1,5 3 2,4 4 1,7 4 1,4 
Nuclear 2 2,2 2 1,5 3 1,6 5 2,1 
Biomass 3 3,6 11 8,3 21 9,9 28 11,0 
Wind 0 0,0 5 3,7 24 11,4 33 12,9 
Utility-Scale Solar 0 0,0 0 0,0 7 3,3 17 6,8 
Other 5 5,8 5 4,0 0 4,0 0 0 
Total 93 100 133 100 207 100 247 100 
Residential Solar 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,3 1,5 8,2 3,2 
Total Solar 8,3 4,8 25,2 10 




In 2015, Brazil reemphasized its commitment at the landmark Paris Agreement of the UNFCCC by 
pledging to increase the use of renewables other than hydro up to 28 % – 33 % by 2030 
(Goldenberg & Roberts, 2015).  Brazil’s current president, Michel Temer, ratified the Agreement of 
Climate Change in 2016 (Appendix: C. Photos). While not legally binding, the intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDC) are supposed to guide future energy policies of signatory countries 
and need to be renewed every five years. The pledge to further diversify the energy mix sent a strong 
signal to the renewable energy community in Brazil and thus strengthened the government’s long-term 
commitment for the solar sector (GVces, 2016). 
 
The most up to date solar expansion forecasts were presented in the 2017 issued and revised 10-year 
Energy Expansion plan (PDE 2026), which projects the country to reach a cumulative solar PV 
deployment of more than 13 GW in 2026, up from 84 MW in 2016. Figure 5 outlines the 10-Year solar 
expansion targets for centralized solar power.6 Centralized generation is foreseen at 9,66 GW, while 
distributed generation is estimated at 3.57 GW (EPE & MME 2017). With almost 10 GW grid connected 
capacities, solar would account for 4.8 % of Brazil’s 2026 domestic electricity supply. Due to reduced 
electricity demand caused by the ongoing political and economic crisis in Brazil, the new plan however 
also downward adjusted its previous 2017 target to 960 MW.  
 
Figure 5 EPE 10-Year Solar Expansion Plan, 2016 - 2026  
 
 
Source: own illustration with data from EPE & MME 2017 
 
Although the projected timeline for the development of solar is not binding, adhering to its set schedule 
strengthens the government’s credibility and sends the right signal to the sector. The International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA, 2016b), sees renewable energy target setting as the key 
element for a successful solar policy framework (discussed in Chapter 2.3). Figure 22 in the 
Appendix shows the 2026 Energy Expansion Plan for all energy sources. 
                                                     
6 While projected with an expansion of 3.5 GW by 2026, distributed generation is not included in calculations for the domestic electricity supply as 
its systems are by design only for self-consumption and thus not connected to the grid 
7 Figure 25 in the appendix shows the projected expansion for distributed sola generation up until 2026 
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2.2 Governance and Stakeholders  
Brazil’s energy sector is the third largest in the Americas, after the United States and Canada (ren21, 
2017). The electricity sector was essentially in government’s hands until the early 1990s, characterized 
by centralization of operations and planning as well as vertical integration of the transmission, 
distribution and generation of the sector. Following years of a state controlled regime, reform changes 
helped to liberalize the sector and established the institutional framework that is today guiding the 
energy market policy (IDB, 2014). As Figure 6 illustrates, the National Council for Energy Policy 
(CNPE8) is at the top of the whole sector advising the presidency on overarching policies by focusing 
on ensuring adequate power supply. The Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME9) is responsible for 
the overall policy setting. As supporting arms of the MME, the Energy Research Company (EPE10) 
is responsible for long-term planning of generation and transmission expansion, while the Electricity 
Sector Monitoring Committee (CMSE11) monitors the safety and efficiency of energy supply. The 
policies developed for the domestic power market are independently regulated and controlled 
by the National Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL12) through the help of the Electric Energy 
Trading Chamber (CCEE13), which as off-taker coordinates the electricity commercialization (wholesale 
market clearing house / auctions), and the National Grid Operator (ONS14), which controls the 
generation and transmission of electricity (Enel, 2017). The authorized and regulated activities are then 
carried out through Brazil’s national utility provider Electrobras (holds ca. 40% of capacity), other state 
owned utility companies and private sector companies that hold distribution concessions. The National 
Development Bank (BNDES) supports the entire system through adequate funding (Transfer LBC, 
2015). Finally, as Solar Photovoltaic Industry Association, ABSOLAR15 represents all solar market 
stakeholders and promotes the uptake of PV electricity in Brazil (ABSOLAR, 2017). 
 
Figure 6 Institutional structure of the Brazilian Electric Sector 
 
Source: own illustration based on Transfer LBC (2015), Enel (2017a) and ABSOLAR (2017) 
                                                     
8 Conselho Nacional de Politica Energética (CNPE) 
9 Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME) 
10 Empresa de Pesquisa Energética (EPE) 
11 Comitê de Monitoramento do Setor Elétrico (CMSE) 
12 Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica (ANEEL) 
13 Câmara de Comercialização de Energia Elétrica (CCEE) 
14 Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico (ONS) 
15 Associação Brasileira de Energia Solar Fotovoltaica (ABSOLAR) 
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2.3 Support Policies & Instruments 
The legal framework for the solar energy market has had some significant developments in the last few 
years as Brazil shifted its focus from small scale projects of kilowatt-scale (distributed generation) to 
utility-scale (centralized generation) solar power plants. Besides the overall objective of energy 
affordability, quality and security (MME & EPE, 2017), solar specific policies were created to achieve 
the following strategic objectives (BNDES, 2016b): 
 
i. Contribute to the diversification of the national electricity mix 
ii. Promote the progressive establishment of a national solar equipment value chain 
iii. Enhance the competitiveness of Brazilian companies + foster innovation  
 
To achieve these strategic objectives, the Brazilian government employs three support mechanisms to 
mobilize private sector investments and incentivize the deployment of centralized solar generation: A) 
Auctions, B) financial incentives and C) fiscal incentives. 
 
a) Auctions 
Auctions are the key instrument to generate demand for all forms of energy developments in 
Brazil (Ferraz, 2016). The motivation to use auctions stems from the fact that the government is 
traditionally favoring large scale power plants (centralized) over distributed (decentralized) power 
systems (AHK, 2014). According to the renewable energy think tank IRENA (2012), the price 
competition resulting from an open market auction is best suited for the early market development of a 
new technology such as solar. To prevent discontinues market development, auctions need to be 
scheduled regularly and are usually held on an annual basis. Ferraz (2016) stressed the 
importance of a regular and stable demand for solar panels in respect to the development and 
sophistication of a mature solar supply chain in Brazil. Only companies established in Brazil are eligible 
to take part in the bidding. The Ministry of Mines and Energy typically specifies the capacity which is up 
for auction as well as the exact project generation location. ANEEL coordinates and organizes the 
annual bidding events and sets the initial (ceiling) price, after which project developers can submit a bid 
for a specific solar power park, pitching their project proposal and outlining the price per unit of electricity 
at which they can best realize it. ANEEL then compares the different offers on the basis of price and 
other criteria and signs a 20-year purchasing power agreement (PPA) with the most competive 
bidders (Lucas et al, 2013). From the different types of energy supply auctions employed in Brazil, the 
most common types for solar are the A-3, which happens three years prior to the planned project 
operation date, and the reserve energy auctions, which is used to contract additional capacity for 
security of supply (IRENA, 2015). Table 9 in Appendix provides a list of every renewable energy 
auctions between 2007 and 2015.  
 
b) Financial incentives 
Along with demand generation auctions, financial incentives are essential instruments for the still 
immature solar industry in Brazil. Market interest rates are currently not affordable for project 
developers and thus require subsidies. Brazil’s state owned development bank BNDES is the key 
player for financial incentives. In accordance with its mandate as inductor of economic development for 
public priority sectors, it allocates subsidized interest loans to renewable energy project developers that 
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fulfil its specific lending requirements (BNDES, 2017, discussed in more detail under 2.4.2). Once an 
enterprise has been awarded with a generation project at the annual auction, it can apply for the best 
terms of credit from BNDES.16 Next to BNDES as the key financier for the renewable energy industry 
in Brazil, the public banks CAIXA and Banco do Brasil as well as regional development banks, most 
prominently BRDE (South) and Banco do Nordeste (North-East) provide complementary credit lines 
and/or serve as extended arm of BNDES (Ortus Engenharia, 2016). Furthermore, pre-investment 
support is provided by Innova Energia, which provides subsidies of up to 90% for R&D project with 
specific energy efficiency standards. 
 
c) Fiscal incentives 
In addition to financial incentives, the Brazilian policy makers also provide fiscal incentives in the form 
of import tax exemptions and state tax (ICMS17) exemption. The in 2011 issued Decree7660 
established for the first time import tax exemptions and set those for solar PV equipment in the range 
between 2 % to 10 %.18 The still pending legislation (317/2013) aims to introduce import tax exemptions 
for solar PV generation equipment where there is no equivalent local production available. State tax 
(ICMS) or value added tax (VAT) exemption are currently valid until the end of 2021. Furthermore, 
projects that score particularly well on the environmental impact assessment can obtain additional tax 
benefits from case to case (IRENA, 2015).  
 
The Brazilian government pursues a solar PV nationalization plan that foresees a progressive 
value chain integration of the local equipment supply chain next to expanding the demand of 
generation capacities (BNDES, 2017). Essentially, the plan stipulates that a minimum amount of 
equipment for solar PV projects in Brazil must be sourced from manufacturers based in Brazil. This so 
called local content rule (LCR)19 aims to protect the local industry in its infant stage from cheaper and 
more competitive international imports. Figure 7 illustrates how the combined intervention of 
government held auctions and fiscal as well as financial incentives is meant to initiate a virtuous cycle 
of job creation and industry sophistication that leads to gradual price reduction of the technology 
and an improved competitiveness of the Brazilian solar sector (BNDES, 2016b). 
 
Figure 7 The progressive nationalization plan for solar PV in Brazil 
 
Source: BNDES, 2016b 
                                                     
16 Table 8 in the appendix provides an overview of the interest differentials between BNDES loans and commercial facilities 
17 In Portuguese: Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços (ICMS) 
18 As defined in Tax Table for Industrialised products (TIPI Table). Solar PV: 8541.40 




2.4.1 Terms & structure 
Accessing attractive rates of financing is seen by many industry observers as the biggest challenge to 
solar developers in Brazil (Transfer LBC, 2015; BMWi, 2016; BNEF, 2017; Ferraz, 2016; Andreão et al, 
2017). The loss of Brazils investment-grade in 2015 added to the already difficult local funding 
landscape. High inflation levels allow the central bank to offer interest rates only above 10 %. By the 
time a typical bank loan is passed on to consumers, a 15 % interest rate20 is often normal (BMWi, 2016). 
As solar technology still needs to bridge the funding gap21 between economic and financial viability, 
attractive long-term financing is currently only available through the National Development 
Bank BNDES or its accredited financial institutions (Currie, 2017; BNEF, 2017; (Andreão et al, 
2017). 
 
As intermediary of public money, BNDES’ mission is “to foster sustainable and competitive development 
in the Brazilian economy, generating employment while reducing social and regional inequalities” 
(BNDES, 2017b).22 Put differently, BNDES is the key financier for channelling long-term credit into 
less developed financial markets (Torres & Zeidan, 2016). It acts either directly or indirectly23 through 
accredited financial institutions such as the public banks CAIXA and Banco do Brasil as well as regional 
development banks, most prominently BRDE24 (South) and Banco do Nordeste (North-East). Figure 8 
provides a graphical illustration of the operational structure of BNDES funding support for solar 
development in Brazil. 
 
 
Figure 8 Operational structure of BNDES funding support 
 
Source: own illustration based on IRENA 2012 and BNDES 2017b 
 
                                                     
20 Figure 23 in the Appendix compares commercial and public financing interest rates for renewable enery projects in Brazil 
21 Figure 24 in the appendix provides illustrates the funding gap along the innovation pathway for new technologies such as solar, IRENA (2012) 
22 Table 11 and 12 in the Appendix provide more details about the organizational background and structure of BNDES 
23 In 2016, direct lending and indirect lending operations comprised 45% and 55% respectively 
24 Banco Regional de Desenvolvimento do Extremo Sul 
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BNDES receives its funds from the compulsory pension fund for workers (so called FAT)25, the national 
treasury as well as international borrowings or capital market operations (BNDES, 2017b; Mazzucato 
& Penna, 2015). Solar energy supporting facilities include A. the Climate Fund (support for the 
acquisition of machinery and equipment as well as project implementation related to the reduction of 
GHG emissions and adaptation to climate change), B. FINAME (financing support for the purchase and 
sales of energy efficiency machines and equipment), C. FINEM Energia (financing the expansion and 
modernization of the power generation infrastructure in Brazil), and D. Automático (funding for 
production capacity expansion of MSMEs). Figure 23 in the Appendix provides a detailed overview of 
the different funding options in Brazil. FIMAME is the most important BNDES facility for long-term 
renewable energy project finance (BNDES, 2014). 
 
Long term loans through BNDES’ FINAME facility are currently offered with an interest rate 
between 9.1% and 13.56% (fixed long term interest rate of 7.5% + BNDES margin + risk spread26). 
Indirect financing comes at a slightly higher cost (fixed long term interest rate of 7.5% + financial 
intermediation rate + commercial bank spread). The amortization period for solar projects varies per 
loan size27 and project risks but can be up to 20 years (BNDES, 2017b). Furthermore, the bank offers 
financing of up to 80 % of the total investment value of a given solar project. With a BNDES 
participation of up to 80 %, project developers therefore always need to fund 20 - 40 % of the required 
capital through a combination of equity and debt instruments from shareholders or other financial 
investors (BNDES, 2016b). Assuming the development and construction of a new solar park requires 
capital costs of US$ 150 million, BNDES could contribute a max. of US$ 120 million, while the remaining 
amount would need to be sources from traditional funding facilities. Figure 9 illustrates the importance 
of BNDES financing.  
 
Figure 9 Project finance structure for infrastructure projects  
 
Source: BNDES, 2016b 
                                                     
25 Public fund for social tax contribution over all Brazilian enterprises net operating revenues 
26 Margin to cover non-performing loans 
27 a detailed overview of the different financing options per funding facility is provided by Figure 21 in the appendix 
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2.4.2 Local content rule 
Under the progressive nationalization plan for solar, the local content rule is the key eligibility 
requirement for accessing public funding in Brazil. Essentially, BNDES specifies local content criteria 
for PV equipment that project developers who want to gain access to its subsidized loan 
program must comply with. BNDES adapted the approach from the successfully applied local content 
methodology in the wind power sector (BNDES, 2014). Realizing the shortcomings of its weak financing 
support for the sector, the bank reviewed and revised its lending methodology in 2017 (BNDES, 2017a, 
c). The following paragraphs discuss the key difference between the old and the new local content rule 
lending conditions. 
 
2014 – June 2017: Old Methodology 
From October 2014 to June 2017, BNDES employed a three-phase schedule that accredited the 
materials and processes required to produce a Photovoltaic module (solar panel) and Photovoltaic 
system (module + electric components, metal structure, inverter) into basic, optional and premium local 
content items (Table 2). BNDES differentiated between crystalline silicon solar panels and thin-film 
panels (see Table 12, Appendix B.). Basic items (green), such as the module, had to be assembled or 
produced in Brazil in order to obtain funding, optional items (yellow), such as the Glass or Junction 
box, could be imported, while premium items (red), such as the wafer or silicon, were due to their 
higher technological sophistication not required to be sourced locally. A so called “N-Factor”28 
determined the minimum percentage of local content by aggregating the balanced percentage scores 
of each component.  
 






















Source: adapted, translated and modified from BNDES, 2016b 
 
Under the old methodology, BNDES stipulated a minimum “N Factor” of 60 % for the PV module 
up to December 2017. With respect to the PV system, a progressively increasing BNDES participation 
                                                     
28 Nationalization Factor 
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ranging from 56% (up to December 2017) to 76% (January 2020 onwards) was established. The 
amount of financing that a project developer could receive from BNDES was derived from its 
maximum participation percentage (at the time 70%) multiplied by the “N factor” (See Table 4 
below). A higher “N factor” thus results in a higher amount of public funding, which gives the project 
sponsor the flexibility to decide whether to source a component locally or from abroad. If a project 
developer, for example, decided to assemble only the module in Brazil (60%) while sourcing everything 
else from abroad29, BNDES’ funding would be restricted to 42 % of the investment costs (60% x 70% = 
42%). If a project developer however would decide to produce also the cells and the glass in Brazil 
(60%+30%+10%= 100%), BNDES could provide 70% of the total project costs (100% x 70%).  
 
June 2017 – onwards: New Methodology 
On the 28th of June 2017, BNDES introduced a new local content methodology for the accreditation of 
PV equipment, a move aimed at “simplifying the rules, raise the banks participation in financing, 
increase flexibility, reduce the scope of obligations and extend the deadlines for changing the 
incentive level" (BNDES, 2017c). The complex old “N factor” formula, which was widely considered to 
be one of the main obstacles in accessing public funds (Transfer LBC, 2015; Goldenberg & Roberts, 
2015; Ferraz, 2016; Andreão et al, 2017), was substituted with a new and simplified accreditation 
Factor C (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 New methodology: local content requirements for PV generation system 
 
Source: adapted and translated from BNDES, 2017c, d 
On first sight, the new schedule is much easier to read and only differentiates between mandatory 
(green) and optional (yellow) accreditation items. The complete module assembly, frame, 
encapsulation, electrical components as well as metral structures are now considered mandatory 
local content components and thus must be sourced locally in order to access BNDES financing. All 
other items (Glass, Backsheet, Junction box and cell) are optional and thus will be counted as 
bonus to the accreditation factor if sourced locally. Furthermore, crystalline silicon and thin-film panel 
technology are treated equally and have with the exemption of the module assembly the same 
accreditaton factors. Overall, it becomes clear that the new methodology focuses more strongly on the 
                                                     
29 Foreign manufacturers of renewable energy and energy efficiency technology must pay a 14% tax surcharge on imports. 
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assembly for local content and leaves project developers the flexibility to source more technologically 
demanding processes from abroad. Also, with the minimum local content of 80% until December 2019 
(Table 3 above), followed by a 90% requirement until December 2022 (Note, that the inverter becomes 
a mandatory item as well) and 70% thereafter, BNDES significantly raised its funding partcipation. Yet, 
the most significant change is the preferential financing for micro, small and medium sized 
enterprises (MSMEs). For MSMEs, the new accreditation factor (formerly called N Factor) will no 
longer be applied and operations shall have 100% of BNDES’ new funding participation of 80% (Table 
4). For larger companies, the old formula of multiplying the maximum participation percentage (80%) 
with the respective accreditation factor C remains unchanged.  
 
Table 4 Comparison of funding participation under the old and new methodology 
Company Size Operational Revenue*  Old Methodology  NEW Methodology 
Micro Below US$ 110 thousand 
› Factor N x 70%  
› Directly 80% BNDES 
participation 
Small Below US$ 1.10 million 
Medium Below US$ 92 million 
Large Above US$ 92 million ›  Factor C x 80%  
* All figures as of 31 Dec 2016 / Exchange rate R$ 1 = US$ 3.26 
 




















CHAPTER 3 - CURRENT STATE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
3.1 Investments 
3.1.1 Private Sector 
According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance Data (2017), Brazilian renewable energy investments 
progressed closely in line with recent economic boom and bust cycles between 2004 and 2016 (see 
Figure 10). Investments increased almost exponentially until 2008 before getting slumped by the effects 
of the global financial crisis. While 2011 again represented a major growth year, mainly due to the 
strong contribution of the wind power sector that accounted for 50% of the total investment in that year, 
the economic downturn in 2014 clearly proved to be a less than ideal backdrop for a fairly stable 
renewable energy development until then. Despite returning to a decent investment volume of US$ 8,3 
billion in 2014, the year 2015 and 2016 witnessed a gradual decline. While wind energy sector 
investments have seen tremendous growth since 2009, the solar PV sector almost didn’t appear in 
Bloomberg’s statistics until 2015. Specifically, investments in solar asset finance grew from US$ 700 
million in 2015 to $1 billion in 2016. The growth of 40% is a direct result of the investment uptake from 
the solar energy auctions held in 2014 and 2015 (in detail discussed under Chapter 3.2.1) from which 
Brazil anticipates exponential growth in the coming years. 
  
Figure 10 Investments into Renewable Energy in Brazil, 2004 - 2016 (in billion USD) 
 
Note: EST stands for Energy Smart technologies. Total values include estimates for undisclosed deals. Includes corporate & government R&D 
and spending for storage projects 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance Data (BNEF, 2017) 
Comparing the actual investments for 2015 and 2016 of US$ 1.7 billion with the investments made 
during previous years, a significant upward trend is noticeable. In fact, solar is representing the biggest 
investment share besides the traditionally strong hydro power. The investment uptake can be explained 
by the recent introduction of the auction mechanism, which provides a platform for international 
















3.1.2 Public sector 
According to the BNDES investment plan for 2015 to 201830, funds of US$ 36,4 billion (R$ 118.8bn) 
were allocated for power generation projects in Brazil, of which US$ 17,25 billion were expected to go 
to hydro, US$ 10,9 billion to wind and approximately US$ 2.02 billion (R$ 6,6 billion) to solar power 
development (see Figure 11). Another US$ 6,26 billion was expected to go towards financing other 
power generation sources (BNDES, 2014). The public investment figures have a strong practical 
relevance for the renewable energy sector as BNDES is the main source of long-term debt for large-
scale infrastructure projects in Brazil. While the plan is not binding, it has historically had a 91% 
accuracy rate, according to BNDES (2014). Without sufficient funding, the project construction gets 
delayed until further notice. In addition, the reason why private companies participated at the annual 
demand auctions was the belief to receive adequate funding support through state subsidized loans 
from BNDES (Chapter 2.3 and 2.4 above). Without sufficient funding, project implementation gets 
delayed or even runs the risk of getting cancelled.   
 
When looking at total BNDES commitments for solar between 2015 and 2018 (Figure 11: right site), 
there is a noticeable discrepancy between the planned and actual investment volume. As of July 
2017 (BNDES, 2017c), the bank has only invested R$ 200 million (US$ 61 million) into industry 
developments (supply site) such as new factories, adjustments or expansions for implementation of 
new production lines. Its demand site (installations) support is even further behind schedule. BNDES 
approved its first financing for a solar power generation project almost three years after the first 
commercial solar projects were awarded in Brazil. In May 2017, it extended a credit for 79% of the 
total investment volume or R$ 529 million (US$ 144 million) for the Pirapora Solar Complex in Minas 
Gerais (BNDES, 2017e). Considering the finance structure of a typical project (Figure 9 above), this 
means that most project developers had to rely on equity and commercial debt instruments for funding.   
 
Figure 11 BNDES investment plan 2015 – 2018, Power generation by source (in billion USD) 
 
Note: Exchange rate used – BRL/USD = 3.26 
Source: BNDES, 2014, 2017c, 2017e   
 
Aggregating the total supply and demand site support for the solar sector up until May 2017, BNDES’ 
promotional business accounts for merely 11% (R$ 529 million + R$ 200 million = R$ 729 million) 
                                                     




of the banks projected investments until 2018 of R$ 6,6 billion. Relative to all solar financing 
investments in 2015 and 2016 (Figure 10 above), its promotional business represents a similarly low 
12,5% of the US$ 1,7 billion total investment. Considering that BNDES will already publish its new 
investment plan in December 2017 (after the three-year completion), the investment target is far from 
being achieved. While the failed achievement of the promotional business can be attributed to the 
detrimental economic and political realties since 2014, BNDES should take part of the blame as well as 
it is mandated to provide countercyclical support in the event of challenging financing conditions. In 
either way, BNDES’s current funding is not helping project developers to fulfil their 
implementation timelines and thus puts in question the adequateness of the strict lending 
requirements (Chapter 2.4.2). Despite the upward trend (first financing awarded in May 2017), BNDES 
is currently not fulling its role as key financier for channelling long-term credit into the less developed 
solar markets (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12 Development of investments in Solar PV vs. BNDES contribution 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from BNDES (2017c), BNEF (2017) and MME & EPE (2017) 
 
3.2 Implementation 
3.2.1 Deployment of generation plants 
Solar PV was added to the open tendering process of general renewable energy auctions for the first 
time in 2012. In 2013, while only the second year having solar energy included in the mix, the auctions 
attracted 400 applications for PV utility development (Andreão et al, 2017). Yet, due to the open 
competition between the different energy auction sources, wind farms ended up as auction winners. 
From 2009 until 2016, a total of 509 wind farms were contracted, comprising a total of 13.4 GW of 
expected capacities (ANEEL, 2016c). While the promotion of wind power since the late 2000’s has been 
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Table 5 Solar Energy Auctions in Brazil 2014 – 201631 




Capacities       
(in MW) 






invested           
(in Mio R$) 
1 Auction 10/2014 31 89032 88,2 10/2017 4.144 
2 Auction 08/2015 30 834   84,3 08/2017 4.341 
3 Auction 11/2015 33 929 78,2 11/2018 4.396 
4 Auction 12/2016 ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ 
 Total 94 2.653   12.882 
✘ Cancellation of Auction  
Source: own illustration adapted from MME, 2017 
 
As Table 5 outlines, the first solar only auction for large scale PV projects took place in August 
2014 resulting in 31 power plant winners with an average sales price of US$ 88,2/MWh for a 20-year 
electricity power agreement (MME, 2017). Its commercial operation date (COD) was at the time 
anticipated for October 2017. The 2014 auction was followed by two more auctions in August and 
November 2015, contracting 63 purchasing power agreements (PPA) worth 834 MW and 929 MW with 
a scheduled start of operation for August 2017 and November 2018, respectively. Reduced electricity 
demand caused by a worsened macroeconomic outlook led the government to call off its only 
solar auctions for 2016 (Gaylord, 2016). Overall, the generation capacities contracted amount to a 
total of 94 power plants with a cumulative capacity of 2,653 MW. Project locations were spread over 10 
states with Bahia (894 MW), Minas Gerais (510 MW) and São Paulo (275 MW) receiving most of the 
installations (Figure 13).   
 



















                                                     
31 Table 10 in the appendix provides and a more detailed overview of project winners and their plants, capacities and investments 
32 This figure has also been reported at 1048 MW  
Source: adapted from EPE & MME (2017) 
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From the first to the last auction, the average bidding price fell from 88.2 US$/MWh to 78.2 
US$/MWh (Table 5 above). While the cost reduction trend moved in the right direction, industry analysts 
(BNEF, 2016, 2017) perceived some of the in 2014 contracted prices as very tight and predicted 
struggles in the face of the recession.33 As solar power delivery contracts were fixed in Brazilian reais 
and not in dollars, contracts signed in 2014 significantly lost their value due to inflation. As Figure 
14 shows, the 2014 average auction price deteriorated by 25%, yielding US$ 66 in Dec 2016 as 
opposed to US$ 87 (R$ 215,5) per MWh in October 2014. In contrast, 2015 auction winners saw their 
power delivery contracts appreciating by 10 % and 16 % respectively as they benefitted from an inflation 
upwards adjusted reais value. 
 
Figure 14 Solar PV power delivery sales prices in US dollars ($/MWh) vs. Dec. 2016 exchange rate 
 
Note: 2016 exchange rate – 31 Dec 2016: USD 1 = BRL 3.26 
Source: own illustration based on data from ANEEL (2017d,f) 
 
In addition, the unexpected cancellation of the highly anticipated 2016 auction left many stakeholders 
“perplexed” and was widely criticized for sending the wrong signal to the Brazilian supply chain 
(Kenning, 2016). From a strict demand and supply site perspective, overcapacities left the government 
with no choice. Yet, the fact that the auction was cancelled on short notice (5 days prior to 
schedule) was attributed to poor institutional planning and therefore resulted in a loss of credibility to 
the government (Gaylord, 2016; Andreão et al, 2017).  
 
With respect to the successful implementation of the 2017 schedule, ANEEL’s latest “General Summary 
of Solar Generation Projects” registers a total installed grid connected capacity of 148 MW34 (Table 
6). The capacities belong the Lapa Solar Park in the north-eastern state of Bahia, where the Italian 
utility group Enel has begun operation with two of its plants in June and August 2017 (see Appendix C. 
Photos). The current capacity installations account for 5,5% of all awarded projects since 2014 and 
represent 8.6% of the projects expected to be delivered by August and October 2017 respectively 
                                                     
33 The levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) for solar in Brazil was at the time estimated much higher at around 95 US$/MWh, BNEF (2017) 
34 148 MW refers to the new added centralized generation capacity  
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(Table 5: 1.763 MW). Given the resulting delta of 91,4% not delivered projects (148 MW / 1763 MW), 
the progress falls short of the implementation schedule and puts into question the construction 
status of the remaining plants. 
 
Table 6 Solar power plants and capacities in commercial operation as of 15th August 2017 
2017 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Nov Dec Σ 
MW 
Installed 
0 0 0 0 0 120 0 28 - - - 148 
No. of 
plants 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 - - - 2 
 
Source: adapted from (ANEEL, 2017a) 
 
While Canadian Solar Inc. managed to successfully deliver its project within the August 2017 deadline, 
6 out of 8 winners from the 2014 auction requested ANEEL in April 2016 for permission to pospone the 
scheduled operation date by 2 years from October 2017 to Ocotber 2019  (BNEF, 2016). In response, 
ANEEL introduced a so called “de-contraction auction” to allow financially distressed 
companies to opt out of their contracts from previous solar energy auctions. The auction was 
held on the 28th of August 2017 and resulted in 249,66 MW of power contracts being terminated by 
9 project developers (PVM, 2017). This helped project developers who struggled with the financial 
feasibility of their projects (Figure 14 above) to cancel their contracts officially and thus avoid a potential 
litigation with the government (Dykes, 2017). 
 
To assess the construction status of the other projects, a closer look at ANEEL’s performance 
measurement methodology is required. ANEEL’s inspection committee is typically tracking the 
implementation and expansion of planned solar projects according to four performance indicators: A. 
Viability, B. Adherence to deployment schedule, C. Construction progress, and D. Compliance 
with periodic reporting. Using the data of ANEEL’s (2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2017a, 







The viability of projects is defined as a parameter to examine the economic feasibility 
of the project irrespective of the adherence to the foreseen timetable. ANEEL 
distinguishes between the following three categories: 1) No restriction for entering 
operation: Plants with environmental license and civil works in progress, 2) Some 
restriction for entering operation: Plants with works not started or with unfinished 
environmental licensing, 3) Severe restriction for entering operation: Plants with 
suspension of the environmental licensing process or declaration of environmental 




Results ANEEL’s August 2017 review report indicates that only 38 % of all awarded solar 
projects are currently considered economically feasible (Table 7). This accounts 
for 1083 MW out of 2830 MW35 expected for the next two years (ANEEL, 2017a). In 
contrast to the originally expected 1763 MW, ANEEL downward adjusted its projection 
to 683,53 MW for 2017. Given the currently installed 148 MW (Table 6 above), 535,5 
MW are still expected to be installed until end of the year. At the same time, 47 % of 
the projects awarded since 2014 are currently stalled due to “some” (e.g. unfinished 
environmental licensing) or “severe” (e.g. environmental unfeasibility, lawsuits) 
restrictions for entering operation. In other words, the economic viability of these 
projects is put into question. Lastly, 415 MW are due to severe problems not expected 
to go into operation at all (relates “de-contracting auction” discussed earlier). 
 
 
Table 7 Projected new solar installations in MW for entry into operation - 2017 to 2024  
 
 
Source: illustration adapted and modified from ANEEL, 2017a 
 




ANEEL also classifies new solar generation projects according to their adherence of the 
deployment schedule and distinguishes thereby between the following three categories: 
1) delayed: The last event of the schedule not performed on the deadline, 2) normal: The 
last event of the schedule performed on the obligation date, or, events scheduled, even 
if not performed, are still within the term of obligation and 3) advanced: Last scheduled 
event held in advance of the scheduled date.  
 
Results Analyzing the adherence to schedule of Brazilian solar plants, the numbers show a 
negative trend: as of July 2017, out of 107 PV36 power plants analyzed only 6.5 % (7 
projects) of all awarded solar plants are in an advanced schedule while 38 % (41 
projects) are according to schedule and 55% (59 projects) are delayed (see Figure 11). 
It is worth noting that projects with construction delay increased significantly from 
ANEEL’s review in March 2016 to July 2017. 
 
 
                                                     
35 ANNEL’s figure for total solar expansions until 2019 of 2829 MW is not in line with the MME auction figure (Table 4). The different 
measurement is attributed to different  
36 The number of inspected projects by ANEEL of 107 clashes with the figures published by the MME and EPE (94). This is can be attributed to 
the lacking coherence between regulatory institutions, which sometimes also report 1048 MW of contracted capacities for the 2014 auction 
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                    Figure 15 Implementation status of new commercial solar operations 
 
      Source: own elaboration based on ANEEL (2015, 2016a, 2017b) 
 
 




Lastly, the inspection committee of ANEEL classifies solar projects according to their 
construction status. This is to verify whether the civil works of the structure has already 
begun or whether there is a halt of the construction work due to lawsuits, foreclosure or 
loss of the environmental license. ANEEL classifies the construction progress as either 
1) not started: The inspection did not verify the beginning of the civil works of the main 
structures of the plant, 2). Under construction: the inspection confirmed the beginning of 
the civil works of the main structures of the plant or 3). construction interrupted: civil 




Looking at the progress of construction as of April 2017, only 18.7 % (556 MW) of the 
solar capacity expansions are currently under construction (ANEEL, 2017c). In 
contrast, 36,7 % (2845 MW) of all wind power and 26,5 % (485 MW) of all biomass 
expansions were under construction (see Figure 16). At the same time, construction has 
not yet started with 81,3 % (2425 MW) of the solar plants, which seems concerning 
considering the much lower figures of wind (53,6%) and biomass power plants (71%). 
 



























ANEEL’s inspection team also monitors whether the project responsible company is 
delivering a quarterly project progress report called RAPEEL37. The compliance with this 
periodic reporting is graded according to the following four categories: A (higher than 
3.75); B (between 2.75 and 3.75); C (between 1.5 and 2.75); and D (lower than 1.5). The 
grades are the quarterly average of the monthly fulfilment of reporting obligations. A 
“zero” indicates that the company did not send the report, a “one” indicates that the report 
was sent out of the tolerance period; a “two” indicates that the report was incomplete, 
incorrectly answered or answered without standards; a “three” indicates that the report 
was sent in the tolerance period but delayed; and a “four” indicates that the report was 




The last publicly available statistics of the RAPEEL tool results date back to July 2017. 
Comparing the results of solar power projects against those of wind power and hydro 
(Figure 16) no significantly worrying results are apparent. In fact, 88.3 % of all projects 
deliver their reports timely and only 11,7 % either sent the reports after the deadline 
or incomplete. Interestingly, the performance of all three renewable energy sources 
seems to be very much alike with respect to reporting. While the other parameters gave 
more reason for concern (Andreão et al, 2017), this figure proves an upward trend and 
shows that most solar project companies comply with their reporting requirements. 
 










                       Source: own elaboration based on data from (ANNEL, 2017d) 
 
 
 3.1.2 Establishment of a local supply chain  
The industrial development of the Brazilian solar market is still considered to be at an early market 
stage (Nuoshu, 2017; Reuters, 2017; Lopes Sauaia, 2017; Andreão et al, 2017). Like many other 
industries in Brazil, the renewable energy industry is heavily protected against low-cost foreign 
competition through tariffs and financing incentives. With low competition, supplier margins are fat 
and cost competitiveness is low. Other structural issues such as high taxes, poor infrastructure and low 
technical expertise are adding to a challenging market dynamic for investors (Bloomberg, 2017).  
                                                     






















A B C D
Solar plants RAPEEL Grades Wind power RAPEEL Grades Hydro power RAPEEL Grades
 
 27 
The Brazilian government incentivizes investments in the local supply chain by stimulating demand 
through annual auctions and providing tax as well as financial incentives (2.3 Support Policies & 
Instruments). As subsidized funding is linked to a strict local content policy (section 2.4.2 above), 
international solar equipment companies need to set up local production facilities. Regular 
demand is crucial to allow the supply chain to mature and compel companies to make the necessary 
expenditures in training and specialized labor (Andreão et al, 2017).  
 
According to reports (Transfer LBC, 2015), at least 500 MW solar delivery contracts must be 
awarded annually to justify investments in new production facilities. Considering the fact that 
more than 2,6 GW have been contracted through previous auctions, the criteria has been more than 
fulfilled to justify supply chain investments. When looking at the local PV manufacturing landscape 
(Figure 18), almost all technical components required for a solar PV system are currently registered in 
Brazil. As of February 2017, ABSOLAR lists 6 companies with respect to module manufacturing, 
10 for system assembly, 8 for inverters38, 6 for trackers39 and 4 for the Junction box40. 
 
Figure 18 Map of solar equipment suppliers in Brazil as of Feb. 2017 
 
Source: adapted and updated from Sauaia (2017) 
 
Most manufacturing locations are in the state of Sao Paulo. All companies are certified local content 
producers through BNDES’s newly established accreditation process (section 2.4.2). As the list of 34 
producers includes both active (full capacity) and inactive (not running at capacity) as well as small and 
large scale producers, it is difficult to judge the actual degree of industry sophistication. Nevertheless, 
the fact that no local module supplier was available in Brazil three years ago indicates that the supply 
chain matured tremendously over the years. Tecnometal, for instance, used to be the only large module 
supplier for a long time (Andreão et al, 2017). With the inauguration of Brazil’s largest module 
manufacturing facility – 400 MW per annum - in December 2016, another company - Canadian 
Solar – has joined the crucial supply chain segment. On top of that, the Chinese renewable energy 
                                                     
38 A solar inverter (also converter) is responsible for converting the variable direct current (DC) from a solar panel into a utility frequency 
alternating current (AC), Wiki (2017) 
39 A tracker is a device that orients (rotates) the solar panel toward the Sun, Wiki (2017) 
40 A junction box is an enclosure on the module where the PV strings are connected and distributed to the inverter, Schneider Electric (2017) 
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technology company BYD has also opened a solar panel factory in April 2017 (BYD, 2017) with a total 
production capacity of 200 MW.Considering an expected demand of 1 GW solar PV capacities per year 
(Figure 5 above), the currently relevant large-scale module manufacturers will not be able to supply the 
entire market. Globo, Premier, Csem, Minas Sol or Sunew are considered relatively small players (20 
– 50 MW) that are positioned to cater mostly to the small scale residential (solar roof top systems) 
market. Given the impending market boom, new utility-scale manufacturing facilities with an 
annual capacity of 200 MW to 400 MW remain highly demanded in the foreseeable future. 
Furthermore, as Brazil does not yet have a complete solar supply chain in place, imports of cells, solar 
grade silicon or other materials are still required (Table 3 above: shows the equipment that BNDES 
allows to be imported). 
 
Most technology companies that invested in Brazil continue to have sourcing options in countries like 
China, India or Europe. Due to Brazil’s cost competiveness problem, cheap international imports 
from China - said to be up to 40 % cheaper (Reuters, 2017) - pose extreme difficulties for investors. 
In addition, the cancellation of Brazil’s only solar auction in 2016 was very bad news for the industry. 
With a bleak outlook and a year without new orders, industry analysts (Gaylord, 2016) see companies 
that are unable to capitalize on more competitive export markets on the verge of bankruptcy. Thus, 
despite respectable advancements in maturing the solar PV supply chain, the industry faces 
much uncertainty after the auction cancellation.  
 
Figure 19 illustrates the overall dynamic of the current solar market in Brazil. Capacities expected to be 
delivered in 2017 and 2018 (red = original commercial operation date) are going to be delayed and are 
according to the latest projections by ANEEL not even fully implemented. ANEEL foresees a total of 
1082 MW (blue) to be likely to enter operation over the course of 2017 and 2018 (Table 7 above), while 
the auction in fact contracted 2653 MW. Thus, under current projections, the Brazilian solar 
manufacturing industry faces an uncertain outlook for the years 2019, 2020 and 2021. Despite 
these negative trends, the government’s announcement to award new solar projects at the December 
2017 auction raises hopes again and sends a positive signal to the Brazilian solar market. 
 
Figure 19 Comparison of solar capacity projections according to different sources 
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CHAPTER 4 - SUMMARY & CONLUSION 
Back in October 2014, Brazil belatedly held its first national solar auction awarding contracts for the 
construction of 31 solar parks with an expected capacity of 889 MW. It was the dawn of solar power in 
Brazil, a country desperate to reduce its drought afflicted energy dependence on hydro. Three years 
and a recession of historical proportions later, Brazil’s plan to unleash its unexploited solar potential 
is moving much slower than anticipated. This research paper analysed the extent to which solar 
support mechanisms have been effective and outlined the status and progress towards delivering on 
the 2024 target of 7 Gigawatt new large scale solar generation capacities.  
 
The findings show that as of August 2017 merely 2% (148 MW) of the for 2024 targeted 7GW solar 
power capacities are currently operational. Considering that Brazil’s 10-year energy expansion plan 
targets 960 MW of solar PV capacity installations for 2017, the current progress also falls short of the 
set short term targets. Project developers are crippled by supply deficiencies and challenging financing 
conditions in the face of a rapidly changing exchange rate landscape. The Brazilian Real depreciated 
as much as 40% during the economic downturn and eroding electricity demands stalled the 
government’s drive towards energy diversification, all of which negatively affected policy 
effectiveness (Figure 20: Outcome). As a result, some of the solar parks that were expected to deliver 
power on 2017-2037 are likely to go into operation with 1 or 2 years’ construction delay.  
 
Despite worse than expected outturns and challenging conditions on the short-run, the medium to 
long term prospects for solar in South America’s largest electricity market remain good. Brazil 
is too exposed to its dependence on hydroelectricity to not care about the solar market and government 
support policies will need more time and adjustments to gain traction. As for the deeper structural 
problems that affect the sector's competitiveness, a concerted and coherent approach is required to 
deal with both supply (local industry sophistication) as well supply-site (installation, financing) issues. 
New demand auctions are scheduled for end of the year and projects with environmental licencing and 
advanced civil works totalling 1 GW are expected to be operational in the first half of 2018. With the 
economy expected to pick up pace again, Brazil’s solar promise is inching closer towards realisation. 
 
As for the near future, the government needs to address the sector’s underlying weaknesses and find 
ways to make state interventions more efficient. The following challenges need to be addressed: 
 
› Insufficient financial support: The only bank with attractive long-term financing, Brazil’s 
development bank BNDES, significantly underachieved its targeted promotional business by 
distributing only a pitiful 11% of its earmarked budget of R$ 6.6 billion to support the solar 
deployment in Brazil. In fact, only one financing loan for a solar utility project has so far been 
approved by BNDES, which raises the question of the adequateness of the current lending policy. 
As BNDES is eager to ensure that the impending solar boom is rooted in a solid domestic 
manufacturing industry, funding needs to be designed more intelligently to fit the resources of the 
sector. So far, only R$ 200 million have been invested in new factories, adjustments or expansions 
for implementation of new production lines. (Figure 20: Inputs). 
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› Policy uncertainty: The unexpected cancellation of the fourth-generation auction in 2016 due to 
an electricity market oversupply has severe implications for the solar supply chain in Brazil. A year 
without orders puts many uncompetitive companies at the brink of bankruptcy. While industry 
observers understand that the government cannot support solar power during periods of 
overcapacity, the government’s reversal of promised support is likely to discourage companies 
considering investments in manufacturing capacities in Brazil in the future. In order to regain lost 
trust and build credibility with investors, the government needs to be more consistent about its solar 
commitment. Abandoning the solar industry after compelling so many manufacturers to make 
investments in the market is short lived and keeps the sector in unnecessary uncertainty (Figure 
20: Inputs).  
 
› Adequateness of nationalization plan: Brazil’s protectionist nationalization plan that foresees a 
progressive value chain integration of the local solar equipment supply chain has so far been a big 
obstacle for project developers. The notorious “Brazil cost” - thick red tape, impenetrable taxes, 
high inflation, an unskilled workforce and poor infrastructure - is crippling local suppliers and makes 
them internationally uncompetitive. According to reports, local solar modules are as much as 40% 
more expensive than Chinese imports. To qualify for low interest loans from BNDES, projects must 
commit to source a significant number of components from local suppliers. This severely affects 
the viability of many projects as the Brazilian solar market is still relying on imports. BNDES’ 
introduction of a new local content rule in June 2017, which focuses more strongly on the assembly 
and less technological demanding processes, was a good step forward (Figure 20: Output A). 
 
› Slow Project Execution: Most of the solar projects awarded since 2014 face serious execution 
problems and are not likely to be operational any time soon. Out of 107 contracted projects, only 
6.5% are currently ahead of schedule while 55% of all projects are running a construction delay. 
On top of that, only 19 solar power plants have started construction and 47% face difficulties in the 
projects economic viability as a result of which 250 MW of power contracts signed in the past few 
years had to be cancelled. Nevertheless, as the first solar park by Italian energy company Enel 
started operations in June 2017, the market seems to finally gain traction (Figure 20: Output B). 
 
As this research solely gave an overview of the current industry situation, future research should 
continue to observe the market status and progress towards delivering solar energy targets. Some 
ideas for future research could be dealing with the following issues:  
 
A. Extension of the research findings by means of a more detailed analysis between the distributed 
and concentrated solar generation markets in Brazil with respect to potential and adequateness of 
policy design and regulation;  
B. Diversification of the research design by focusing primarily on exploratory interviews with policy 
makers and regulatory institutions (e.g. ANEEL, BNDES, EPE, MME), solar project developers (e.g. 
ENEL, Canadian Solar) or scholars and analysts (e.g. Bloomberg, FGV); and 
C. Market analysis of the emerging PV manufacturing industry in Brazil with research focus on 
the long-term perspective and competitiveness in global markets under the background of 
increasing price competition from China. 
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Figure 21 Electricity Flux – BEN 2016 / year 2015  
 
Source: (EPE, 2016) 
 
 
Figure 22 10-Year Energy Expansion Plan, 2016 - 2027 







Figure 23 Interest Rate Comparison between solar financing mechanisms available in Brazil as of July 2017 
 
 
Note: Interest rates are only indicative and don’t distinguish between company size (MSME or Large Scale) or lending duration (short or 
long-term). Thus, some interest charges of regional banks are lower than BNDES’ key interest rate of 9.1% as they refer to shorter 
amortization and grace periods as BNDES. The trend is nevertheless visible: state-subsidized loans are much cheaper than those of 
commercial banks like Itaú or Santander. 
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Figure 24 Innovation Pathway for solar: Funding Gap and Policy need 
 






Figure 25 10- Year Expansion plan for distributed solar generation in Brazil 
 
 















































B. Tables  
Table 8 Financing instruments available for solar projects in Brazil 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Big Data – Websites of individual banks 
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Table 9 Renewable Energy Auctions in Brazil 2007-2015 
 
















Table 10 Solar auction winners in Brazil from 2014 to 2015: No. of plants, contracted capacities and investments    
 









Table 11 Evolution of BNDES’ development efforts in Brazil 
The Brazilian Development Bank, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), was 
founded in 1952 as a government agency with the objective of “developing and carrying out national economic 
development policies” (BNDES, 2017a). Initially, the then called “BNDE”41 financed mostly infrastructural projects 
to fund Brazil’s catch up strategy after the 2nd World War. In the 1960s, however, its mandate incrementally 
broadened to include the agricultural, livestock and small and medium-sized (SME) sectors, followed in the 1970s 
by the promotion of Brazil’s import substitution industrial policy and support for energy and agribusiness in the 
1980s. In the 1990s, it played a fundamental role in supporting Brazil’s privatization efforts, assisting in the sale of 
large state-owned companies, next to an increasing focus on rural development through more investments into 
micro, small & medium enterprises (MSMEs) and social inclusion. After 2000, BNDES further widened its 
operational scope towards financing innovation-led growth while focusing increasingly on sustainability issues such 
as green lending and renewable energy finance (BNDES, 2017a).  
 
 
Source: adapted from BNDES, 2017b 
Despite its successful promotional role, most prominently seen with its countercyclical response42 to the global 
financial crisis in 2008/2009, BNDES also faced increasing criticism in recent years for its excessive credit 
expansion strategy during the economic boom years that contributed the ongoing economic crisis  (Bolle, 2015).  
 

















Source: own elaboration based on data from BNDES website and annual reports (BNDES, 2017b; Mazzucato & 
Penna, 2015)  
                                                     
41 Initially only called “Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico” 
42 BNDES provided cheap credit to Brazilian companies during the financial crisis and was thus able to “counter” or minimize the negative effects 
on the economy  




Table 13 Old Methodology: Local Content Requirements for Thin-Film PV Technology 
          
Source: adapted, translated and modified from BNDES, (2016 a, b) 
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Lapa Solar Park in Bahia - Brazil's first utility scale solar plant 
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